GHSA-4CM8-XPFV-JV6F
ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation
Overview
Description
Summary
The email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed From header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input.
Details
Relevant code paths:
src/channels/email_channel.rs:311extracts sender identity from parsed message headers:let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...
src/channels/email_channel.rs:328authorizes using thatfromvalue:if !self.is_sender_allowed(&from) { ... }
src/channels/email_channel.rs:87onward (is_sender_allowed) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value.- There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions.
Result:
- Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced.
PoC
- Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist:
channels.email.enabled = truechannels.email.allowed_senders = ["ceo@example.com"]channels.email.deny_by_default = true
- Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly).
- Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity:
python - <<'PY'
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = "ceo@example.com" # forged trusted sender
msg["To"] = "bot-inbox@example.net"
msg["Subject"] = "forged control message"
msg.set_content("FORGED EMAIL CONTENT")
# Example test SMTP endpoint
with smtplib.SMTP("127.0.0.1", 25) as s:
s.send_message(msg)
PY
- Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing.
- Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender
ceo@example.comand published as inbound channel input.
Impact
- Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization.
- Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed.
- Security effect:
- Spoofed
Fromheaders may bypass logical sender allowlist. - Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities.
- Spoofed
- Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer.
Patch Recommendation
Add a sender-authentication gate in src/channels/email_channel.rs immediately after parsing from (src/channels/email_channel.rs:311) and before allowlist enforcement (src/channels/email_channel.rs:328). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, DMARC=pass, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before is_sender_allowed is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in EmailConfig (for example, sender_verification_mode), but recommend hardened settings in production: dmarc_aligned, exact-address allowlists, and deny_by_default=true.
Source: OX vulnerability database
Severity
6.5 · MEDIUM
CVSS 3.1 base score, scored by GitHub.
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Affected packages · 1
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cargo (Rust) | zeptoclaw | <0.7.6 | 0.7.6 |
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Operating systems
No Linux distribution reports this ID.
References
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