GHSA-JV2H-4P9V-WF5W
ouroboros-ai: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-47211: untrusted project .env can still reach RCE via omitted execution-routing keys
Overview
Description
Impact
The CVE-2026-47211 fix (0.39.0) added _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution. The denylist was incomplete — several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, no review step):
- Backend config-home roots
CODEX_HOME,OPENCODE_CONFIG,OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR,XDG_CONFIG_HOME: a spawned vendor CLI resolves its config from these.CODEX_HOME=./.evil+ committed./.evil/config.tomlredirects the nested Codex agent to attacker config —mcp_servers.<name>.command/args(RCE) andapproval_policy="never"/sandbox_mode="danger-full-access"(silent removal of the human approval gate). (reported by matte1782) - MCP bridge / plugin execution roster
OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG(the YAML's servercommand/argsare spawned via stdio_client — RCE),OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_LOCKFILE,OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_TRUST_ROOT(redirect the installed-plugin roster / trust root soooo <name>dispatches into attacker code). (reported by hackkim) - SSRF guard toggle
OUROBOROS_ALLOW_LOCAL_TRANSPORT(re-enables loopback/private MCP transport targets). - Instruction / capability roots
OUROBOROS_AGENTS_DIR,COPILOT_CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS_DIRS(replace spawned sub-agent role prompts),OUROBOROS_RUNTIME_PROFILE(backend selector),OUROBOROS_TOOL_CAPABILITIES(override YAML can lower a tool'sapproval_class, weakening the approval gate).
Additionally, the MCP bridge auto-loaded ./.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml from the working directory (create_bridge_from_env(cwd=Path.cwd())), so running ooo inside a malicious repo spawned the committed roster's command — RCE with no .env at all. (cwd-branch noted by hackkim)
Patches
Fixed in 0.42.1. All listed keys were added to _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST; the cwd auto-discovery branch was removed (only the explicit OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG env var and ~/.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml remain, both trusted). The regression suite now derives from the source denylist to prevent future drift.
Workarounds
Do not run Ouroboros from an untrusted/cloned repository directory; remove any project-directory .env and ./.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml before running.
Credit
Reported privately via coordinated disclosure by matte1782 and hackkim (https://github.com/hackkim).
Source: OX vulnerability database
Severity
8.6 · HIGH
CVSS 4.0 base score, scored by GitHub.
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Active
- Vulnerable system confidentiality
- High
- Vulnerable system integrity
- High
- Vulnerable system availability
- High
- Subsequent system confidentiality
- None
- Subsequent system integrity
- None
- Subsequent system availability
- None
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected packages · 1
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | ouroboros-ai | <0.42.1 | 0.42.1 |
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Operating systems
No Linux distribution reports this ID.
References
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