Breaking: Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) - Less Than 0.12% of JVMs Estimated at Risk of RCE
Read the Report
Learn How MCP Is Bypassing a Decade of Cloud Security Best Practices
Read the Report
Are you exposed? Connect a repo in minutes.
Scan your repos free

GHSA-CC2G-GQ8C-R332

grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument in FAF tools

Overview

Published
19 Aug 2026
Modified
19 Aug 2026
High GitHub advisory
1 Registry packages
0 OS packages
0 Linux distributions
Yes Fix available

Description

Summary

Several grok-faf-mcp MCP tools accept a caller-controlled path argument and resolve it (~ expansion + path.resolve()) straight into a filesystem read without confining it to a trusted project directory. An absolute path or ../ traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read files outside the intended .faf project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.

Affected tools

refresh_faf, faf_score, faf_get_orchestration_policy, refresh_blend (and the shared getProjectPath() chokepoint feeding the .faf tools), plus the general-purpose faf_read / faf_write file tools (denylist-only; an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and faf_write could write outside the project). refresh_faf echoes the file contents verbatim back to the caller as "fresh DNA"; faf_get_orchestration_policy reflects values parsed out of the attacker-chosen file and echoes the resolved absolute path — confirming the read.

Impact

An MCP client — or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or .faf) into issuing a tool call — can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cloud credentials (~/.aws/credentials), .env files, source, /etc/passwd. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared .faf project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).

Patches

Fixed in 1.5.3 by confining every caller-supplied path before any filesystem access (safe-path.ts):

  • Reads are restricted to .faf / .fafm context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.
  • General file ops (faf_read / faf_write) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS).
  • Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and ../ escapes are rejected.

Upgrade: npm install -g grok-faf-mcp@1.5.3 (or bunx grok-faf-mcp).

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.

Credits

Discovered and responsibly reported via coordinated disclosure by Zhihao Zhang (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).

Source: OX vulnerability database

Severity

7.5 · HIGH

CVSS 3.1 base score, scored by GitHub.

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Affected packages · 1

Packages affected by GHSA-CC2G-GQ8C-R332
EcosystemPackageVulnerableFixed in
npm grok-faf-mcp <1.5.3 1.5.3

Open a package to see all its vulnerabilities.

Operating systems

No Linux distribution reports this ID.

References

OX Radar and Response Center

Find threats in your stack.

OX Radar can check high-priority threats, like critical package CVEs, against your context.

Each incident is marked Detected or Not Detected with a remediation plan and proof all tracked in the Response Center.