GHSA-R766-3V88-PFCF
where_is_waldo authenticates ActionCable connections from a client-supplied subject_id when no authenticate_proc is configured
Overview
Description
WhereIsWaldo::ApplicationCable::Connection (the gem's built-in ActionCable
connection) authenticated the connection from request.params[:subject_id]
whenever no authenticate_proc was configured. Because request params are
client-controlled, a client could connect with ?subject_id=<any id> and be
authenticated as that subject, enabling impersonation and cross-account
presence-roster disclosure (authentication bypass by spoofing, CWE-290).
Only applications that mount the built-in connection without configuring
authenticate_proc are affected; applications that supply their own
authenticated ActionCable connection (e.g. deriving current_user from a
verified JWT) or configure authenticate_proc are not.
Fixed in 0.1.6: the params path is permitted only in local development/test; in production the connection fails closed unless an authenticated source establishes the subject.
Source: OX vulnerability database
Severity
UNKNOWN
No CVSS vector in the source. Severity comes from the advisory.
Affected packages · 1
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| RubyGems | where_is_waldo | — | 0.1.6 |
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Operating systems
No Linux distribution reports this ID.
References
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